Monday, December 05, 2011

Is Turkey running out of steam in the Middle East?

CUMALİ ÖNAL

Turkey’s star has been rising since the arrival of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, and it has recently been ranked among the countries with the greatest branding value.


The Middle East has become an open field for Turkey following a vision formulated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. As the West struggles with economic collapse Turkey has made bold moves and the US has become more dependent upon Ankara. In addition, its tough policy vis-à-vis Israel and the Arab Spring, not to mention the popularity of Turkish TV series, has raised Turkey’s profile in the region. However, as change gains momentum in the region, some commentators have begun arguing that Turkey has been unable to adapt to the circumstances. Davutoğlu, who visited the region almost on a weekly basis before the Arab Spring, has decreased the frequency of these visits in recent months.

It should be noted that Turkey’s relationships with countries in the region developed by the AK Party administration gave the impression that it had become a strong and reliable player in regional affairs. This image, which was further consolidated by moves in relation to Palestine as well as certain initiatives taken to address various crises in the region, had underlined that Turkey was an important part of the balance in the Middle East.

Considering its efforts, it is difficult to argue that Turkey has achieved what it wanted in the Middle East.

Turkey has been disappointed on the Palestinian front, where it expected a lot and which had served as a cornerstone of its Middle East policy. The prime minister’s showdown in Davos and his statements on Gaza may have raised his popularity on the Arab street, but its political gains for Turkey were limited.

Hamas praised Turkey out of political considerations but never sided strongly with Turkey, whereas it did not hesitate to maintain close contact with Syria or Iran. It never considered Turkey’s views a priority. Al Fatah, the other major Palestinian organization, made clear from the beginning that it was not in favor of Turkey’s involvement in their matters.

In fact, paying attention to the Palestinian issue bothered some regional powers including Egypt, which had strong interests in Palestine. Turkey realized this and stepped back. In respect to Israel, Turkey’s strong and harsh policies have not worked out well so far, either.

Shortly after the “one minute” incident in Davos in 2009 Turkey lost nine activists in the controversial Mavi Marmara incident, eventually leading it to sever diplomatic ties with Israel, one of the strongest and leading power centers in the region. Turkey has been voicing excessive demands including compensation and an apology for the families of the victims, as well the lifting of the blockade in Gaza. Asking Israel to lift the blockade is the same as asking it to hand over East Jerusalem to the Palestinians. Ankara, which concluded that Israel would be alienated in the region after losing Turkey, has not seen any move from Israel that would meet its expectations. It is really hard to expect that Israel would knock on Turkey’s door unless the region is stabilized after the turmoil associated with the outbreak of the Arab Spring has settled.

When it came to Libya, one of the most lucrative locations for Turkish businessmen, Turkey made one of its gravest mistakes in foreign policy during the time of the AK Party. Or, at least this was the impression among the public because it was not adequately explained to them. Turkey failed to sense the intention of the West to interfere in Libya and initially gave the impression that it was siding with the Gaddafi regime.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s opposition to the sale of arms to dissidents in Libya led to an attack on the Turkish Consulate in Benghazi. Davutoğlu stressed on many occasions that he was opposed to NATO intervention. Turkey had the chance to demonstrate initiative in the case, particularly after its successful operation of evacuating a huge number of people from the conflict zone; however, it missed its chance and instead became one of the countries that attracted anger. Although it attempted to restore its image through a number of moves, it was too late in Libya. A new government is being formed in Libya, but Turkey is not being allowed to take an active part in the process of reshaping the country.

In terms of Egypt, the big brother in the region, Turkey made a historic move and became the first country to stand up against the Mubarak regime; many people have still not forgotten Erdoğan’s statement. High-level visits to this country were made by Turkish officials after the end of Mubarak’s rule, but now almost nobody mentions Turkey in Egypt. Maybe the rapid change in the country is the primary reason for this situation. Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt was undermined by the Muslim Brotherhood, which organized a crowd to stage a demonstration against him because of its anti-Israeli stance; this seriously bothered some pro-Turkey groups. The Muslim Brotherhood is now uncomfortable with references to the Turkish model as an alternative for Egypt. This movement displays nationalistic tendencies and holds that Egypt should be the leader of the Middle East and Arab world.

In Turkey’s own backyard, Syria, Ankara has put a lot of effort into avoiding a repeat of its mistakes in Libya. Since the beginning it has brought together different opposition groups and made them into a unified coalition. However, with international actors now getting involved, Turkey’s influence over Syria is fading. The opposition groups are now flirting with the Arab League and France. Turkey’s regular threats are not being taken seriously by the Damascus administration.

It is possible to argue that this is also similar to the cases of Iran and Iraq.

Why is it that Turkey is unable to get the results it desires despite what seems like pretty active efforts in foreign policy?

As diplomats note, the main response to this question is that Turkish foreign policy adopts an identity similar to that of the Turkish national football team; it does not have a precise and certain style, so it sometimes makes a striking performance vis-à-vis strong teams but ends up being defeated by relatively insignificant teams. A second response is that its foreign policy was formulated solely by Davutoğlu’s identity and personality and that he is the one showing all the initiative. Third, there are not enough Turkish diplomats with a good knowledge of the region, nor do they speak the dominant language in the region, Arabic. The fact that Turkish diplomats follow developments and protests on Turkish TV rather than Arabic TV confirms the gravity of this state of affairs. Also, Turkey still does not have any press secretaries in most countries in the region; in rare instances where they do have them, they are often not sufficiently trained or equipped.

In a region where even communists have extensive knowledge about religion, Turkish diplomats in Egypt in particular have little information on their own religion irrespective of whether they practice it or not.

Foreign policy decisions are not made based on the voices on the streets. The impact of rhetorical approaches is not lasting. Therefore, Turkey’s policy towards influential intellectuals who may be able to shape the decisions of a country is unknown. Conferences held by think tanks financed by the state are used as opportunities for meeting with other academics and colleagues; however, it is a great disadvantage that these are always the same people attending these events. Likewise, failure to diversify the range of intellectuals and journalists invited to Turkey shows that Turkey is unable to carry out good PR.

The same also applies to Turkish universities: Universities where intellectuals and future politicians are supposed to be nurtured are not open to the Arab world and are not known by people in the region.

The notion of neo-Ottomanism, a term attributed to Davutoğlu, who is dismissive of arguments that he relies on this ambition to further Turkey’s foreign policy goals, is being used effectively in the region against Turkey. Turkey’s opponents frequently refer to this notion in an attempt to undermine Ankara’s reputation.

Turkey once had a reputation greater than its ability and size; however, over time it has become apparent that this reputation has no substantial basis.

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